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not to deny that God's nature and commands make some things good, bad, 
obligatory or wrong which would not be so otherwise; nor to deny that God's 
nature and commands make things more good, bad, obligatory, or wrong than 
they would be otherwise. My objections are old objections, but an essay in 
defence of divine command theory will not carry conviction unless the author 
has something to say about them. 
God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?, by 
Kathryn Tanner. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988. Pp. 
196. Cloth $43.95. 
THOMAS F. TRACY, Bates College. 
Kathryn Tanner's subtle and historically rich study is centrally concerned 
with the relations between claims about God's creative sovereignty and 
creatures' powers of action. Traditionally, Christians have claimed both that 
1) "a radically transcendent God exercises a universal and unconditional 
agency," and 2) creatures possess "their own power and efficacy," and in the 
case of human beings are "free and therefore responsible for the character of 
their lives" (pp. 1-2). Under modern conditions of thought, Tanner contends, 
it has become commonplace to assert that these two statements involve a 
contradiction. Contemporary theologians uncritically share the modem as-
sumptions that lead to this appearance of inconsistency, and so they seek to 
solve the problem by weakening one (typically the first) or both of these 
claims. In doing so, they display a "curious forgetfulness about the rules for 
proper Christian talk" (p. 5), for there is an earlier and well-established 
tradition in theology that embodies rules of speech which, if carefully fol-
lowed, make it possible to affirm both divine sovereignty and creaturely 
agency. Tanner's program, then, is to uncover these rules, display their mutual 
consistency, and show how they are distorted or forgotten under the influence 
of certain avoidable modem assumptions. 
Tanner begins with a chapter on method in which she explains the linguistic 
tum of her approach. Statements about God, she contends, are best understood 
as instructions about how to talk about God. This move to second order 
discourse is not simply a useful device for analyzing theological utterances. 
Tanner makes the much stronger claim that this reflects the intrinsic limits 
of speech about God. She adopts an agnostic reading of Thomas' distinction 
between the res significata and the modus significandi: 
Theologians simply assume that what they say about God is meaningful and 
true: they have no way of actually specifying what they are talking about (the 
res significata of their statements) apart from the meanings of the terms they 
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use and it is just those meanings whose applicability to God they admit to 
failing to understand (p. 12). 
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Theological statements are "informationally vacuous," they tell us nothing 
about God. They do, however, establish rules for what should and should not 
be said of God, and this linguistic practice shapes Christian religious life. 
This account of religious language (and this reading of Thomas) faces a 
variety of difficulties, and an interest in the regulative functions of theo-
logical statements certainly does not commit one to these wider views. On 
this account, when we say "God is good," it appears that we are saying 
roughly the following: "It is correct for Christians to say 'God is good,' 
although we cannot state any positive relation between the meaning of the 
predicate' good' when we ascribe it to this subject and when we say of 
any other subject that it is good. This statement about God, however, is tied 
in certain ways to other Christian statements (spelled out in further theolog-
ical rules of discourse) and to the practice of Christian life." This predicative 
agnosticism bears an uneasy relation to Tanner's concern to show the consis-
tency of Christian claims. For, first, if a 'veil of ignorance' is drawn between 
the way we speak of God (the modus) and the referent of that speech (the 
res), then it is not clear that we should worry about contradictions in the 
former (which need not, after all, signify in God what they signify for us). 
On this account one might argue that Christians ought not to be troubled if 
they find the right sort of inconsistencies in their utterances, e.g., inconsis-
tencies that result from conjoining elements of first-order Christian discourse 
that ordinarily are used to counteract complementary errors in religious prac-
tice. This would be a provocative argument to make, but it is not the result 
Tanner intends. 
Tanner indicates that the rules she will identify are highly formal; materi-
ally different theologies, using distinctive vocabularies for talk about God 
and the world, should be able to satisfy them. In each case, the rules will 
specify how to modify patterns of speech carried over to theology from other 
contexts; in particular, certain inferences that might ordinarily be warranted 
in non-theological contexts will be blocked when this language is pressed 
into theological service. Although these theological rules "fracture" and "vi-
olate" the rules of ordinary linguistic practice, they serve to establish "the 
coherence of Christian claims that otherwise appear to conflict with one 
another" (p. 27). 
The first two rules that Tanner states concern God's transcendence and 
creative agency. There is a putative contradiction, she contends, between the 
claims that 1) "God transcends the world," and 2) "God is directly involved 
in the world as its creator" (p. 38). The tension between these assertions, 
which she traces in Hellenistic cosmologies, results from defining divine 
transcendence "contrastively." When the divine is delineated by contrast with 
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the non-divine, God's transcendence and God's involvement with the world 
stand in inverse relation to each other. As God's transcendence is emphasized, 
God's dealings with the world are restricted, and this "inevitably [brings] 
God down to the level of the non-divine" as one limited being among others (p. 
46). Christian discourse, Tanner argues, avoided this paradoxical result by fol-
lowing a rule requiring that God's transcendence be defined non-contrastively, 
viz., "avoid both simple univocal attribution of predicates to God and world and 
a simple contrast of divine and non-divine predicates." This rule is conjoined 
with a second: "avoid in talk about God's creative agency all suggestions of 
limitation in scope or manner" (p. 47). These two rules are systematically inter-
connected; we can satisfy the second only if we conform to the first. 
These rules playa crucial role throughout Tanner's study. It is worth noting, 
therefore, some puzzles about the notion of a non-contrastive account of 
transcendence. Are all contrasts between God and world to be denied? Tanner 
sometimes speaks this way. God, she suggests, "is not characterized by con-
trast with any sort of being" (p. 46), and "it is the mutual exclusiveness of 
all apparent antitheses ... that must give way before such a God" (p. 79). At 
the very least, however, a contrast is asserted between beings that are defined 
by some network of contrasts (i.e., finite beings) and that Being who cannot 
be so defined. Further, the concept of such a Being is paradoxical if defined 
in terms of contrasts as such (viz., the Being, in contrast to all other beings, 
who cannot be defined by contrasts) rather than in terms of some particular 
contrast or set of contrasts. It follows that the argument will fail which claims 
that establishing a contrast between God and the world inevitably leads to 
treating God as one limited being among others. The lesson to be learned 
from Hellenistic thinkers, it would seem, is not that we should avoid con-
trasting God and world, but rather that we should be careful about which 
contrasts we draw. To say that God is ingenerate does not appear to impose 
any limitation on God's activity, wlei\e to say that God is impassible may 
impose certain limits. The debate on these questions continues, and there 
seems to be little prospect of ending it with the claim that all such contrasts 
entail impermissible limitations. On at least one reading, therefore, the first 
rule does not constitute a necessary condition for satisfying the second. 
Given these basic rules of Christian discourse, Tanner turns to the central 
question of her study: if God's agency in the created world is universal, 
unconditioned, and immediate, can creatures exercise powers of their own 
and, in at least some actions, be free? The first two rules, she argues, entail 
the subsidiary rule that creatures exist in "total and immediate dependence 
upon God" (p. 84). This has as its correlate the principle that every action of 
creatures, including free intentional action, is founded in God's prior agency 
"directly and in toto-in power, exercise, manner of activity and effect" (p. 
86). Divine and created agencies are not in competition, as though one must 
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give way to make room for the other. Rather the actions of God and of 
creatures occur on two different levels-the vertical and the horizontal, or 
the primary and the secondary-that are reflected in separate "orders of 
predication." The statement that an event is contingent or that it is a free 
intentional action does not conflict with "the creature's complete determina-
tion by God's creative agency." For talk of contingency and freedom "simply 
concern[s] the nature of the relation between created beings and their created 
effects" on the horizontal level (p. 90). An effect in the world can be entirely 
attributed to God's primary causality and to the creature's secondary causal-
ity, for God's creative agency brings about the existence, operation, and effect 
of 'the finite agent. These reflections lead to several more subsidiary rules, 
the heart of which is that God's agency must in no way be conditioned by 
creatures, e.g., by operating among creaturely causes as a partial or contrib-
uting cause (p. 94), by affecting creatures' actions rather than by effecting 
them (p. 95), or by adapting the divine activity to the independent or opposed 
actions of creatures (p. 96). 
Is this broadly Thomistic picture sufficient to demonstrate the compatibility 
of divine sovereignty with the causal powers of creatures and with human 
freedom? There seem to be, on this view, real causal relations among crea-
tures. The more difficult question concerns the freedom of finite agents, and 
one's answer will depend upon what sort of freedom one thinks it important 
to claim in Christian theology. Tanner is right that the divine "vertical" 
determination of a finite agent's intentional action is compatible with that act 
being free on the "horizontal" level. One can affirm an incompatibilism that 
is restricted to the creatu~ely context of action, i.e., an agent's free actions 
are not determined by the prior history of the world and the laws of nature. 
But is this enough? God's immediate creative agency brings about not only 
my ongoing existence as an agent with the capacity to make choices, it also 
brings about my choices. Although God does not act alongside or among 
secondary agencies to cause me to act as I do, God's primary activity consti-
tutes me as the agent who performs these acts. God's creative will includes 
each of my choices, and God's will infallibly effects what it intends. Tanner 
acknowledges that there is an important sense in which the finite agent is not, 
on this account, "really free to do otherwise" (p. 178, n. II). But she contends 
that the interest in claiming some stronger freedom for finite agents reflects 
the distorting influences of modernity and brings with it the breakdown of 
coherent Christian discourse. Against this, however, there appear to be con-
siderations internal to Christianity that might lead to the affirmation of such 
creaturely freedom, even if one resists the enchantment of Enlightenment 
claims about autonomy or of deistic pictures of a world that gets along alright 
on its own. For example, one might wonder how, on the account Tanner gives, 
we are to explain the Christian claim that in sin the creature's will has come 
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to be at odds with God's will. Thomists have various strategies of response 
to this question, of course. But a theologian who is not convinced of the 
adequacy of these responses might be led to affirm that part of God's creative 
purpose for us is to grant us a limited freedom in relation to God as well as 
to one another. When talk of such freedom is motivated in this way, it is far 
from clear that it reflects a "theologically inexplicable" (p. 145) departure 
from the basic rules of Christian discourse. 
Given the limits of space, I have not commented here on Tanner's use of 
materials from the history of theology to illustrate her points. Her interweav-
ing of themes from Aquinas and Barth is particularly noteworthy, and she 
provides illuminating commentary on a number of past disputes (e.g., be-
tween Molina and Banez). One of the special contributions of this book is 
that it provides an outstanding model for the use of historical materials in 
exploring issues of contemporary importance in philosophical theology. 
Explanation/rom Physics to Theology: An Essay ill Rationality and Religion, 
by Philip Clayton. New Haven: Yale University, 1989. Pp. ix and 230. 
$26.50. ISBN 0-300-0435308. 
NANCEY MURPHY, Fuller Theological Seminary. 
Philip Clayton's Explanation from Physics to Theology is an intriguing book. 
It pursues a worthy goal in a highly competent manner. The goal is to counter 
the tendency of modern liberal theology to take theological assertions as 
anything but assertions (as expressions of religious feeling, or existential 
orientation, or as moral recommendations) by showing theology to be enough 
like science that whatever truth value science has must accrue to theology as 
well. He begins with an account of the history of philosophy of the natural 
sciences, since these are taken to be our best examples of rational explanation 
and warranted assertability. He then turns to the social sciences, whose con-
cern with questions of meaning has long been said to require an entirely 
different methodology. However, he concludes that the differences have been 
exaggerated-in both cases the essence of science is providing explanations. 
These must fit the explanandum into an accepted framework, and must be 
evaluated by means of a coherence criterion. This move puts him in a position 
to tackle religion, whose cognitive component is understood as a system of 
beliefs by means of which individuals and communities attempt to give mean-
ing to the whole of experience. Theology, then, is a discipline that seeks to 
discover and interpret systems of religious meaning and to assess the truth 
of the religion's theory about ultimate reality according to the canons of 
scientific explanation. 
